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In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 6241

PAUL OLSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 30th day of July, 1939, a complaint was filed
with a Justice of the Peace in Duchesne County, charging
Paul Olson with the crime of carnal knowledge as follows:
hThat the said Paul Olson, at the time and
place aforesaid, one Ruth Dhanens, a female over
the age of thirteen years and under the age of
eighteen years, to wit: of the age of fifteen years,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
did carnally and unlawfully know and abuse, the
said Ruth Dhanens being then and there an unmarried female and not the wife of the said Paul
Olson."
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Olson was regularly bound over to the District Court
for trial and an information was filed by the District
Attorney as follows:
HW m. Stanley Dunford, District Attorney for
the Fourth Judicial District, accuses Paul Olson,
that on the 30th day of July, A. D. 1939, he had
sexual intercourse with the body of Ruth Dhanens,
a female of the age of fifteen years and not the wife
of him, the said Paul Olson."
The case came up for trial before a jury in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah in and for
Duchesne County on the 29th day of August, 1939. The
testimony of all of the witnesses, including the defendant
and the complaining witness, is practically the same up to
the point of the commission of the act of intercourse. The
evidence shows that the complaining witness, Ruth Dhanens,
was a minor of the age of 15 years, and that she had
resided in Vernal for some two years prior to the 30th
day of July, 1939. During this time she had known the
defendant, Paul Olson, only slightly. On the afternoon of
July 30, 1939, Ruth Dhanens met the defendant, Paul
Olson, together with one Walter Baese and a woman by
the name of Violet Jensen on the street at Vernal, Utah,
and Miss Dhanens was either invited, or asked that she
be allowed, to accompany the group to Duchesne, Utah.
The trip was made in an automobile belonging to Mrs.
Jensen. The group left Vernal in the late afternoon and
arrived at Duchesne some time later. Upon arriving at
Duchesne, they consumed a number of glasses of beer at
two different cafes located there. According to the testi'
mony of the complaining witness, the defendant, Paul
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Olson, and Walter Baese drank some gin in the automobile
while they were enroute to Duchesne.
Following the drinking of beer in the cafes in Duch·
esne, the defendant and Ruth Dhanens left the others of
the group and walked down the streets of Duchesne to
an alleyway beside a building owned by the Dry Gulch
Irrigation Company. The testimony of both the defendant
and the complaining witness is that they entered this alley"
way. Here, however, there in a conflict in the testimony.
The defendant maintains that they entered the alleyway to
sit down because the complaining witness was sick and that
they merely sat on the weeds in the alleyway for some few
minutes until she felt better.
The testimony of the complaining witness, on the
other hand, which evidence was evidently believed by the
jury in the case, is to the effect that while they were in
the alleyway, the defendant forcibly, and against her will
committed an act of sexual intercourse with her. After they
left the alleyway, the defendant and Miss Dhanens rejoined
the others of the group, at which time they drank more
beer and after attending a movie started to return to Vernal.
On the way to Vernal they stopped the automobile. Miss
Dhanens and Walter Baese left the defendant and Mrs.
Jensen and walked down the road, at which time, accord.ing to the testimony of the complaining witness, an act of
sexual intercourse occurred between her and Walter Baese.
Upon their arrival at Vernal, the parents of Miss
Dhanens, together with the sheriff of Uintah County and
the night watchman at Vernal, accosted the group, and
upon being told the story of the evening's occurrences
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by Miss Dhanens, took her to the office of Dr. Ralph B.
Hegsted, who performed an examination upon her. Dr.
Hegsted testified that the vagina of the complaining witness
was irritated and inflamed and that it contained live sperm
cells, both of which, the doctor testified, indicated conclusively that an act of sexual intercourse had occurred
between the complaining witness and some other party or
parties within the preceding 24 hours.
The clothing which was worn by Miss Dhanens on
the afternoon in question was introduced in evidence and
the testimony of Miss Dhanens' mother was to the effect
that the dress, the slip and the bloomers which the complaining witness had put on clean on the afternoon of the
30th were, on the early morning of the 31st when she was
examined at the doctor's office, torn and very badly soiled.
ARGUMENT I
The defendant's first argument is in support of his
first and second assignments of error which relate to the
exclusion of evidence as to the reputation of the complain•
ing witness for truth and veracity. The State recognizes
the fact that this court in the case of State vs. Hilberg,
28 Utah 27, and in the case of State vs. Burns, 51 Utah 73,
held, in a prosecution for carnal knowledge, that although
the reputation of the complaining witness for chastity was
not in issue, testimony might be given as to her general
reputation for truth and veracity in the community where
she resides. The statement of the trial court in this case
that this is bad law and should be changed is submitted
for the decision of this court without argument.
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Whetlier or not testimony as to the complaining wit ..
ness's reputation for truth and veracity should generally
be received in evidence, the testimony offered in this case
was properly rejected because of the fact that the witnesses
ailed to testify in this matter were never properly quali .
[ed. The only witness who was placed on the stand for
he purpose of qualifying her testimony in this regard was
. Mrs. Julia A. Lewis. She testified that Ruth Dhanens
tad lived at her place for more than a year, but had left
Lbout nine months preceding the trial of the action and
:hat she had not been around ""much,, since that date. In
>rder to qualify a witness, who testifies to the general
·eputation of truth and veracity of another witness, it must
'e shown that such witness has a knowledge of the general
~eputation of the person sought to be impeached at a time
1earenough to the time of trial to throw some light upon
:he reliability of the testimony given by the witness who is
)eing impeached.
70 C. J. 828 says in this regard:
..The inquiry as to the character or reputation
of a witness affecting credibility relates primarily to
the time when he testifies. While the view has been
expressed that impeaching testimony as to the chaP
acter or reputation of a witness should be directed
to the time of trial or of the giving of testimony by
such witness, or to reasonable period prior thereto,
or should be confined to the reputation of such
witness at or about the time when he testifies, there
is no definite limit as to the time prior to the time
of trial to which the impeaching testimony may
refer; the determination in this regard depends
largely on the facts of the particular case.,,
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On page 8 31 of the same volume the following appears:
••The question as to what period the impeaching
testimony should refer is largely within the discretion
of the trial court."
In this case Mrs. Lewis's knowledge of the truth and
veracity of the complaining witness, whatever it may have
been, was based upon an acquaintance which ended some
nine months previous to the trial. In the case of an adult
whose character is matured, this would not be too remote
a time from the time of trial to have some bearing on the
reliability of testimony given by the complaining witness.
However, it must be remembered that the complaining witness in this case is a fifteen·year old girl whose character
is in a formative stage, who is developing rapidly, and in
whom a change could take place in a period of nine months
or a year.
Whether or not the time regarding which the testimony as to truth and veracity is being taken is near enough
to the time of trial is a matter, as stated above, which depends on the particular facts of the case and upon the
discretion of the trial judge. In this case the time appears
too remote to cast· much light upon the reliability of Miss
Dhanens' testimony and the trial court was within its right
in excluding such testimony on this ground, whether or not
it was right in excluding it upon the ground that the repu'
tation of the complaining witness was not in issue.
Even if the testimony of Mrs. Lewis and the other
witnesses who were called to testify as to the truth and
veracity of the complaining witness, but who were never
qualified to testify was improperly rejected, the ruling of
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the trial court in rejecting such evidence would not prejudice
the substantial rights of the defendant in this case. While
the only direct evidence as to the occurrence of the act
of intercourse is the testimony of the complaining witness,
herself, there is a wealth of circumstantial evidence which
corroborates the occurrence of this act. The testimony of
all the defense witnesses who testified as to the occurrences
on the night of July 30, including the testimony of the
defendant, himself, supports the story of the complaining
witness up to and including the point where the opportunity
for the commission of the act occurred. Furthermore, the
fact that an actual act of sexual intercourse by some person
with the complaining witness did occur, sometime during
the evening or early morning, is conclusively established by
the testimony of Dr. Hegsted.
The only question left open is: Did the complaining
witness have sexual intercourse with Walter Baese, with
the defendant, Paul Olsan, or with both? Her testimony
is that she had it with both. This is the story which she
told the officers and the doctor on the early morning of
July 31, immediately ~fter she returned from Duchesne, and
it is the story which she told on the witness stand.
That she would have invented this story on the spur
of the moment and stuck to it over this length of time is
unthinkable. The facts which surround the occurrence lend
as much support to her story as if she were corroborated
by a dozen actual witnesses to the act of intercourse. The
complaining witness could not be proud of the fact that she
had had sexual intercourse with two men in one evening.
Every natural tendency would be to conceal the fact that
she had had intercourse at all, and then when fright drove
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her to reveal the facts to her parents and to the officers,
her natural tendency would be to minimize the thing as
much as possible and not to invent additional men who had
taken advantage of her during the evening and early mom,
ing. It is even conceivable that had she had intercourse
with one man she might have tried to lay the blame on
another because of some attachment she might have for
the guilty party; but there is no possible or conceivable
motive which could have existed for her to reveal the name
of the man who had taken advantage of her and then try
to implicate, in addition, a man who was innocent. The
credibility of her testimony does not here rely upon her
character for truth and veracity but upon the facts surround,
ing her story. There are circumstances under which the
word of even the most habitual liar cannot be doubted.

ARGUMENT II
Defendant's argument number 2 is in support of his
third and fourth assignments of error. The third assign'
ment of error relates to the refusal of the trial court to give
defendant's requested instruction, number 1, which is a
cautionary instruction directing the jury that in view of
the type of case they should scrutinize the testimony of the
complaining witness with unusual care. The fourth assign'
ment of error charges that the trial court, if it refused the
defendant's cautionary instruction number one, should have
given a cautionary instruction of its own.
The matter of the need for a special cautionary instrUC'
tion in cases such as the one now being considered has
been considered by a number of courts in the United States,
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among them this court. A few decisions, among them
People vs. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, Connors vs. State, 47 Wis.
623, and Reynolds vs. State, 42 N. W. 903, have held
that such a cautionary instruction should be given in cases
of this kind where the prosecution relies entirely upon the
testimony of the complaining witness.
The majority opinion, however, and the opinion which
is followed by this court in State vs. Shaw, 59 Utah 536,
and in State vs. Rutledge, 63 Utah 546, is that the general
instruction given regarding credibility of witnesses is suffi..
cient. This view is also followed by numerous other courts,
among them the Supreme Court of California in People vs.
Rangod, 44 Pac. 1071, and Loose vs. State, {Wis.) 79 N.
W. 526. The latest expression of a court of final resort
in the United States appears to be in the case of Stran vs.
State (Wyoming) 252 Pac. 1030, which case cites with
approval the holding of this court in State vs. Rutledge and
holds that failure to give such a cautionary instruction is
not error.
The defendant in his brief attempts to distinguish the
case of State vs. Rutledge from the case at issue in that
he claims the decision in that case was made on the basis
that the State did not rely upon the evidence of the com.
plaining witness alone but that her evidence was corrobo.rated, whereas he claims in this case that situation does
not exist. A comparison of the facts in the two cases clearly
shows, however, that this attempt at distinction is not well
founded. In both cases the evidence of the actual commis..
sion of the act of intercourse depends solely upon the evi..
dence of the complaining witness. The only corroborating
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evidence in the case of State vs. Rutledge is evidence of a
circumstantial nature which is not nearly so strong as the
circumstantial evidence .which we have in this case. In that
case it was shown that the defendant had courted the
prosecutrix and had taken her out riding on several occasions, that he had represented himself as unmarried, that
he had been seen on one occasion with his arm around the
girl, that he had been seen with the girl at about the time
the act had occurred, and that he had later tried to settle
the matter by payment of money or by marrying the girl.
In the case at bar we have the actual admission of the defendant that he was with the complaining witness at the time
the act occurred at the place she claimed the act had occurred, that no one else was with them, that no one saw them,
and that all of the conditions existed as alleged by the complaining witness, except as to the act of intercourse itself.
We further have the evidence in this case that the
defendant had been drinking and that the complaining witness had also been drinking, and most telling of all we have
the evidence given by the doctor that she actually had had
sexual intercourse at about the time she claimed. Under
these facts, we have in this case much stronger corroborating
evidence than we had in State vs. Rutledge. In that case
the court said:
HThe weight of authority is that such instruc'
tions are improper because they state no rule of law
but are mere arguments and constitute an invasion
of the province of the jury."
The court then cites numerous decisions from other
states to support this position.
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Instructions numbers 10 and 12 given to the jury by
the trial court in this case fully inform the jury regarding
the credibility of witnesses and regarding the degree of
proof necessary to convict the defendant. Any additional
truction would have been surplusage and, as stated by
: court in State vs. Rutledge, mere argument.

ARGUMENT III
In his third argument, the defendant charges that the
al court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a
w trial on the ground that the jury had been guilty of
sconduct, by which a fair and due consideration of the
se may have been prevented. In support of this motion,
e defendant introduced an affidavit from one of the jurors
the effect that this juror had concurred in the verdict
ndered in the case only because of the fact that he was in
or health, and had to have a doctor's attention and could
1t hold out longer; but that he was not and never had been
nvinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
:fendant.
It is strange, in view of the defendant's admission, that
: is aware of the general rule of law which holds that a
ror may not impeach his own verdict by affidavit, that he
.auld ever have assigned this error. This case is so clearly
ithin the general rule that it requires little comment.
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 104.-40.-2, lists among
.e grounds for a motion for a new trial the following:
HMisconduct of the jury; and whenever any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
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assent to any general or ·special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance, such
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any
one of the jurors." ·
This statute has been interpreted by numerous Utah
cases to hold that affidavits of jurors will be received to
show that a verdict was reached by chance but for no other
purpose.
See People vs. Richie, 12 Utah 180; Black vs. Rocky
Mountain Bell Telephone Company, 26 Utah 451; People
vs. Flynn, 7 Utah 378.
In the case of Ogden L. & I. Railroad Company vs.
Jones, et. al., 51 Utah 62, the same question, with which
we are here confronted, was presented. There the court said:
Hit is elementary that a juror may not be
heard to impeach his own verdict. If that were
permitted, one, or perhaps more, of the jurors could
be found in every case who for ·the sake of appeas'
ing the wrath or soothing the feelings of the losing
party would disclose something, for which it could
be claimed the verdict should be set aside. Indeed,
a juror or even a number of them might agree to a
verdict with that end in view. The law, therefore,
wisely provides that a juror may not disclose facts
which would go in impeachment of his verdict."
In treating the contention of the appellant that the
affidavit should not be rejected because it was not objected
to by counsel in the lower court, the court goes on to say:
""The evidence contained in the affidavits, how'
ever, was not admissible upon the ground of sound
public policy. The district court was, therefore,
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bound to disregard the evidence although no objec~
tion was interposed thereto by respondent's counsel.
Indeed, in the case of Siemsen vs. Oakland Railway
Company, the Supreme Court of California reversed
an order of the trial court granting a new trial
which was based upon such evidence. The Supreme
Court of California held that the evidence could not
be considered for the reason that it was against
public policy, and upon that ground alone reversed
the order granting a new trial.,,
Under the ruling of this court in the case of State vs.
Mellor, 74 Utah 104, to the effect that the order of a trial
court granting or refusing a new trial is discretionary and
will not be reviewed unless such discretion is abused, there
is certainly no reversable error on this point. In fact, quite
the contrary, as there was not one iota of competent evi~
dence before the court in support of this motion for a new
trial, if the court had granted it, under holding of the court
in Ogden L. & I. Railroad Company vs. Jones, supra, the
granting of the motion would have constituted ·an abuse
of discretion and reversable error. For other cases holding
that a juror cannot impeach his own verdict by affidavit
see Bryan vs. Mancrief Finance Company, (Ga.) 149 S. E.
424; Jordan vs. St. Joseph Ry. Light, Heating & Power
Company, (Mo.) 73 S. W. (2d) 205; Newton vs. Brass~
field, (N.C.) 152 S. E. 499; Schnalz; vs. Arnwin (Ore.)
246 Pac. 718.
An examination of the record can leave little doubt
of the guilt of the defendant in this case. The facts which
were proved by undisputable evidence lends such staunch
corroborating support to the story told by the complaining
witness that the mind is forced to but one conclusion. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

defendant was given every ,right which could possibly be
granted for him to prove his innocence, but the jury, after
fair deliberation, found him guilty.
The State submits that this verdict should not be
disturbed.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General.
CALVIN L. RAMPTON,
Assistant Attorney General. ·
Attorneys, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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